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Seven years after the transition from plan to market, it is hard to summon
up much enthusiasm for the results of active restructuring of the eastern
German economy. Although companies have made considerable efforts
to reach the efficiency level of their western German counterparts, the gap
is still large.
In our paper, we provide a selective and interpretative account of the re-
structuring process in eastern German manufacturing. We start with
modelling some economic relations which can be considered crucial in
the restructuring process: ownership status and overall performance,
sectoral and regional specialization, gross output and value added, in-
vestment and productivity, and wages and employment. In search of ad-
justment failures, we examine these relations by comparing the perform-
ance of eastern German with that of western German enterprises. Finally,
we discuss the key policy question of how to overcome the difficulties.
Without an about-face in wage policy, it will be difficult to shift the balance
from wage convergence to efficiency convergence. (P 52)1
l&hi/, J do Sdteve we 've Seen under this tree the whole time/ Everything s
/ust as it MAS/... YOeli, in our country ", said /{lice, "... you 'd generally
get to somewhere else - itf you run very fast for a long time as we 've Seen
doitif;.
/$ slow sort <?/ cowitrif/"said the Queen, "Alotv, here, you see it tai'es
ad the running if OK can do, to keep in the sa>ne ptace. Jtf you want to get
somewhere else, you must run at (east twice as fast as that/"
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I Introduction
1
Seven years after the transition from plan to market, it is hard to summon
up much enthusiasm for the results of active restructuring of the eastern
German'economy. Despite massive government support, the gap as to
the western German economy is still large. The economic clash is re-
flected by eastern Germany's poor contribution of less than 10 percent to
the ail-German GDP — compared to a share of 20 percent in total popu-
lation. There is a slowly dawning awareness that there is still a long way
to go for catching up.
Research in preparation for this paper was undertaken with support from the
European Commission's Phare ACE Programme 1995 ..Emerging Market Organi-
zation and Corporate Restructuring in Centra! and Eastern Europe", project-no.
94-0590-R. We would like to thank the participants of the workshop, in particular
the discussant of our paper Adam Torok (Institute for Industrial and Enterprise
Economics, Budapest), for r)elpful comments. We are also indebted to Wolfgang
Winkler for suggesting linguistic improvements.Although everyone agrees that eastern Germany's economy is still in a
poor state, diagnoses differ:
• Most experts insist that the pain is the rapid rise in the level of east-
ern wages relative to eastern productivity. As a result, eastern Ger-
man companies are operating with unit labour costs significantly
higher than their competitors in the west.
• Other experts emphasize low productivity rather than costs of labour.
They argue that despite massive government support for rebuilding,
the eastern capital stock is still inadequate compared to the western
one.
• Other experts, in their part, focus on the low level of sales and, as a
result, the low level of capacity utilization. They find that eastern
companies are poorly integrated into sales networks. These compa-
nies are often too small for serving big retailers or cannot offer prod-
ucts with brand names.
The dispute on the causes of the weak performance of the eastern Ger-
man economy is clearly far from settled. On the contrary, the observant is
faced with a number of puzzles which seem to challenge the traditional
economics of company restructuring in the transition from a centrally-
planned to a market economy.
In their excellent paper on microeconomic aspects of the transition proc-
ess- Aghian, Blanchard and Carlin [1994] proposed a strategy which em-
phasizes the role of private investors as well as governments in the proc-
ess of restructuring enterprises in transition economies. This strategy is
based,on two spearheads, namely fast privatization and massive transfer
payments. It suggests that effective and efficient enterprise restructuring"will depend on the threat to survival from tighter budget constraint which
can be thought as the 'stick' and on the 'carrot' of the compensation avail-
able to the losers which will allow the passage of restructuring measures"
[p. 4]. One can argue that enterprise restructuring in eastern Germany
was completely in line with this strategy. The way unification was carried
out forced policy makers to go ahead with privatization rapidly and reso-
lutely. And as a rapid purchase of enterprises would not have been pos-
sible without enormous job losses, the government had paid considerable
employment subsidies in form of financial concessions associated with
privatization [Schmidt 1996].
However, the poor state of the eastern German economy pursues the
question whether the combination of 'stick' and 'carrot' was optimal in all
respects. While policy makers might claim that the speed of restructuring
in terms of job losses was too fast, economists might criticize that in
terms of efficiency, it was not fast enough. It is a matter of fact that the
overwhelming majority of enterprises are still operating in the red. Only in
a few branches enterprises reached the profitability zone under their own
steam in 1994 (Figure 1). Lewis Carroll's famous tale hits the point:
Against the unpleasant background of rapid wage equalization, it is not
enough to make some progress in the adjustment process. Whoever
wants to advance has to move more quickly. Otherwise he will not get
away from the same place.
In our paper, we provide a selective and interpretative account of the re-
structuring process in eastern German manufacturing. We start with
modelling some economic relations which can be considered as crucial
for rapid rriovement to the western German level of productivity (Sec-
tion II). In search of adjustment failures, we examine these relations bycomparing eastern with western enterprises (Section III). Finally, we
conclude with some observations and implications for economic policy
(Section IV).
Figure 1 - Percentage Return on Sales in Eastern German
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aSYPRO classification. - Enterprises with 20 and more employees.
Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG; own calculations.
II The Economics of Catching-up: The Strategic Variables
Most researchers tend to start research work with what is claimed to be a
"general theory". However, such an approach is often simply an ex-ante
rationalization which ex-post does not stand up to the statistical test. Aswe have learnt from economies in transition, the microanalytics of enter-
prise restructuring is not a textbook case for which solutions are easily
available. Therefore, it is advisable to concentrate first on a set of partial
explanations which will serve to sort out the wheat from the chaff.
Economic restructuring concerns the way enterprises try to achieve com-
petitive advantage. Defining their strategy, enterprises have to decide
• where, that is to say with which products and in which markets they
should compete, and
0 how, that is by which strategy, they could succeed. •••,?;,•
Principally, competitive advantages may be based either on product dif-
ferentiation defined by specialization (e.g., on high quality, exclusive
product design, selected distribution channels) or on cost-leadership (low
production and distribution costs achieved, e.g., by rationalization of the
manufacturing system, pursuing economies of scale, training of staff or
improving of quality control). Clearly, product differentiation and cost lead-
ership can also be attained at the same time.
The development of competitive advantages has been the subject of
many publications [Day 1984; Porter 1985]. However, these have been
mostly concentrated on theoretical considerations. Empirical studies have
been rare. The crucial point is that the determinants of competitive advan-
tages are difficult to operationalize. In particular, the influence of qualita-
tive characteristics such as product quality and design, brand image, reli-
ability of delivery or after sales service can hardly be studied on a global
level.
 ;
Due to various limitations, our study will focus on five general variables.
These are: ownership, sectoral and regional specialization, investment,vertical integration and wage costs. They may hide much more specific
variables according to different conditions and competences of enter-
prises.
(a) The economics of enterprise restructuring correctly emphasizes the
importance of privatization in the transition process. It is recognized
that neither a government or a government agency nor the old man-
agers of the enterprises themselves would have been able to cope
with this task. Privatization can provide best of all what is most ur-
gently needed to create viable firms: entrepreneurial concepts, in-
vestment capital and management skills. However, the impact on
enterprise restructuring — although generally positive — depends
also on the specific implementation of privatization deals. In fact,
there is no evidence for a strong correlation between privatization
and economic success in general [Carlin, van Reenen and Wolfe
1994]. Therefore, closer examination of the relationship between pri-
vatization and restructuring in the course of transition is required.
(b) Western enterprises pervade a strong product specialization in ac-
I. cordance with their comparative advantages. On a global level, this is
defined by the given factor endowment, resp. factor prices. As
(western) Germany ranks at the top of the technology frontier, its en-
terprises have held a strong position in the markets for products with
highly-skilled labour intensity. In a competitive market environment,
the given industry structure can be considered as a rough measure
:;:fbr competitiveness. Consequently, the deviation from the 'normal
pattern
1 (which is supposed to be the present industry structure of
western Germany) can be used as an indicator for the relative per-
formance.A second criterion with respect to specialization is how enterprises
define the spatial dimension of their markets. On the basis of this
criterion, enterprises can serve local, regional, national or interna-
tional markets. Usually, they may tend to concentrate their activities
on home markets which are near to them geographically. In home
markets, transaction and transportation costs are lower and competi-
tive pressure is weaker than in foreign markets. However, in home
markets, sales potential is limited by the size of the resident popula-
tion and their purchase power. Therefore, acting in an international
context may be a strategic target for.enterprises and a high degree of
internationalization (in terms of foreign sales or foreign investment)
can be considered an indicator for competence.
(c) The poor performance of many enterprises in transition economies
stems also from their obsolete capital equipment. Consequently, the
economics of enterprise restructuring gives prominence to productive
investment — to raise productivity by rationalizing production, to ex-
pand production capacity, or both. With respect to eastern Germany,
one has to take into account that the existing capital stock was com-
pletely destroyed by the modus of German unification. As a conse-
quence, an adjustment of employment became inevitable. Labour
shedding in terms of its effects on rising productivity is the comple-
mentary trajectory in enterprise restructuring.
(d) Vertical integration constitutes another form of restructuring strate-
gies. It concerns the stages of value creation activities that enter-
prises integrate. A proxy variable to define the extent of integration is
the ratio of value added to gross output. Usually, enterprises which
are more vertically integrated have a high in-house value added.Compared to enterprises in western market economies, conglomer-
ates in socialist economies were extremely integrated. In a dynamic
perspective, however, there is a general preference for 'buying' over
'making'. Therefore, special attention should be paid to this point.
(e) Although the importance of a low cost position for developing com-
petitive advantages might differ from industry to industry and from
market to market, reaching cost leadership is an important strategic
variable. Among costs of production, labour costs are the most im-
portant. The level of labour costs in relation to (marginal) efficiency is
decisive for the level of employment. It also influences the profitability
of capital and thereby the volume of investment in fixed assets. As
the volume of investment is seen as the crucial variable for eastern
Germany's catching-up in productivity, a trade-off does not only exist
between wages and employment but also between wages and the
adjustment of the capital stock [Thiemann and Breitner 1995]. This
conflict can only be resolved by massive subsidization of either la-
bour or investment, or both. Therefore, the key question is: how can
the balance be shifted in a politically acceptable way from wage con-
vergence to productivity convergence?
Ill Monitoring Enterprise Restructuring: The Constraints
The examination of enterprise restructuring in the transitional process is a
very challenging task for researchers because it requires an appropriate
informational base. Idealiter, a data base on a firm-level should be avail-
able. Realiter, only data on an aggregate level — by industries and by firm
size —are provided because data protection legislation in Germany is
very strict. Therefore, the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW),Berlin, and the Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), commissioned by
the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs to monitor the adjustment proc-
ess in eastern Germany, decided at an early stage to establish their own
data base by way of a survey.
2 The first survey was started in summer
1991 with a sample of 1,700 manufacturing companies, the fifth in sum-
mer 1996 with 2,500 companies. In principle, these surveys can be con-
sidered as a panel since it is tried to keep the population of the sample
stable. However, due to enormous, fluctuations in the eastern German
enterprise sphere — at the beginning, panel mortality as well as panel
entry were very high — only a relatively small proportion of the pane!
members have longitudinal records without missing years. A fairly stable
panel of respondents only exists as from the fourth survey made in sum-
mer 1995.
On the descriptive level, these panel data were examined in a former pa-
per when we tried to find out how different types of companies perform
— for instance with respect to ownership, plant size or industry [Gerling
and Schmidt 1997]. However, there are some limitations in the material
resulting from the survey techniques: the information is collected by a
questionnaire sent by mail. Inevitably, a questionnaire cannot be too com-
plex, covering all the areas under examination — it should not include
more than 25 fully structured questions/Additionally, in order to get'a high
rate of return, it is necessary to avoid crucial questions. It is well known
that companies are usually markedly reticent about their balance sheets
and profit and loss values.
Data collecting and data processing have been carried out by the DIW in its own
responsibility.10
Irvthis paper, we mix some soft data from the panel with hard data pro-
vided by the German Central Statistical Office from 1991 onwards. How-
ever, the change in the classification of industries from the German
SYPRO
3 to the NACE
4 on 1 January 1995 makes intertemporal compari-
sons difficult. Only a few series have been converted from SYPRO to
NACE or vice versa [Gorzig and Noack 1996]. Matching data defined by
different classifications can produce many inconsistencies. This is the
main reason why we abstain from testing the relationships between the
different sets of variables in a systematic manner,,: .
IV The Misalignment of Adjustment: Some Puzzles
1 Ownership Structure and Overall Performance
The most important lesson from the transition process in eastern Ger-
many is that privatization is not a sufficient, but a necessary precondition
for successful corporate restructuring. The privatization of a company
does not guarantee its survival. Like any other company, it can still fail if
its-new owner is unable to cope with the task.
Although the Treuhandanstait carried out its job rapidly and, in terms of
the interaction of economics and politics, effectively [Schmidt 1996], it has
not reached all its goals. In many cases, the business concept proved to
be unable to carry the load. The new owners often miscalculated their
abilities to run the company successfully. They underestimated the diffi-
Systematik der Wirtschaftszweige im Produzierenden Gewerbe (Ausgabe 1979).
Nomenclature generate des activities economiques dans les Commutautes
europeennes.11
culties of restructuring — of reorganizing production and sales, of
generating products and, above all, of developing new markets. Conse-
quently, they overestimated the cash flow and the net value of the com-
pany. In these cases, the successor of the Treuhandanstalt, the Bundes-
anstalt fur vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (BvS), is under strong
pressure to re-negotiate the privatization contracts. One can interpret that
as a second round of privatization through which the failures of the first
round are corrected by markets.
Table 1 - Firms and Employees in the Eastern German Manufacturing
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Privatization in eastern German manufacturing followed different routes:
• First, it involved both privatizing 'from the top
1 by selling existing
Treuhand companies and privatizing 'from the bottom' by founding
new companies. Meanwhile, new firm start-ups, although in manufac-
turing they are less numerous than in trade and services, have clearly12
surpassed the number of privatized and re-privatized firms (Table 1).
However, this dynamics is obviously restricted to the category of
small- and medium-sized firms.
0 Second, it involved both selling to owners and giving back to former
rightful owners. Although the Privatization Law provided for restitution
to assume priority before fresh privatization,-this has been partly
overturned by the so-called Investment Act and/respectively, Invest-
ment Priority Act. Since the government was interested in quick re-
structuring, the former owner, as a rule, was only given preference if
he agreed to make the same investments as another would-be inves-
tor.
• Third, it involved both privatizing firms as 'independent' units in the
, hands of eastern German residents and as 'dependent' firms in the
hands of western German or foreign firms. Eastern Germans got
mainly locked into small-scale production, in particular in the craft
sector.
Referring to the diversity of the privatization pattern, there is no clear-cut
picture of the firms' performance according to their ownership status and
history. As it is obvious from the survey findings, all categories of compa-
nies — privatized, reprivatized and newly founded ones — are still facing
serious competitiveness problems (Table 2). Although their situation has
improved significantly over recent years, more than half of the companies
stated in summer 1996 that they were experiencing great difficulties. A
.closer look, however, reveals a somewhat differentiated picture:
• Companies still owned by the Treuhandanstalt successor organiza-
tion have been the least competitive. This is not surprising becauseBibisothek des instituts
fir Weltwirtschaft Kief 13
the few companies that have not been privatized at all so far are fre-
quently hopeless cases.
Companies privately owned before 1989 or founded thereafter have
started more successfully into the market economy compared to
previous Treuhand companies. Clearly, these companies have suf-
fered less from the heritage of the past than former state-owned
companies. As they are small in size, they have often found a profit-
able niche. Nevertheless, recently they have been facing more and
more difficulties in withstanding market pressure. This might be partly
the result of exaggerated expectations by inexperienced entrepre-
neurs.
Reprivatized companies seem to be significantly worse off than e.g.
newly founded companies. Frequently, these companies had to be
handed over to the heirs of the former owner who often had no expe-
rience or even no interest in running the business successfully. This
may support the view that the partial replacement of restitution by
fresh privatization under the Investment Act and, respectively, the In-
vestment Priority Act proved its worth. However, the poor perform-
ance of re-privatized companies may also be explained by poorer
starting conditions: the owners of reprivatized companies frequently
complained that because they had to accept historic debts or the
damage of historic pollution, they were often treated worse than in-14
vestors in fresh privatizations, which were partly or completely let off
these obligations by the Treuhandanstalt [Muller 1996].
5
• Finally, western German- or foreign-owned companies report com-
petitiveness problems to a lower degree than independent compa-
nies in the ownership of easterners. The difference between the two
categories is smaller than might have been expected, though. At first
glance, the ownership by a western partner does not appear to be a
crucial advantage. However, this result may be affected by other
variables such as firm size or type of industry, considering that the
Treuhandanstalt tended to sell large companies, in particular in
'sensitive branches', mostly to westerners. Data evaluated suggest
that restructuring these companies is more painful than restructuring
" small- and medium-sized companies in other branches.
Regarding the profit situation, rapid privatization and subsidization have
not been sufficient to make eastern German companies fit for competi-
tion. Most of them are still suffering from low productivity, poor product
quality and a lack of reputation so that the turnovers they realize are not
high enough to cover their costs. Especially labour costs impose a heavy
burden on companies, keeping their returns below the break-even point.
The majority of companies had already been transferred to their former owners in
the short time from January to March 1990 during which the last socialist
(Modrow) government was in power.15
Table 2 - Shares of Eastern German Manufacturing Firms Facing
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Firms founded after 1989
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Table 3 - The Profit Situation Perceived by Eastern German

























































































































































From the survey data in Table 3, it can be seen that private firms founded
before as well as after the collapse of the old system report a better profit
situation as previous or current Treuhand firms. Only a relatively small
share of them accounted significant losses, almost one half reached rea-
sonable or small profits. Newly founded firms seem to be most successful
not only in finding a profitable niche in the market but also in coping with
cost pressure: because they are often very small, they can avoid being
members of employers associations and thus, avoid to pay standard
wages. The same seems to be the case with reprivatized companies
which are also mostly small. Surprisingly, they report a rather satisfactory
profit situation, which is in contrast to their poor competitiveness. As a
consequence, the reason for higher profits must be sought on the cost
side, not on the market side here. As already seen in the competitiveness
picture, western German or foreign ownership does not always seem to
be an advantage for eastern German firms. On the one side, these firms
clearly gain from being integrated in the sales networks of their western
partners. On the other side, they still surfer from the heritage of the past.
2 Sectoral and Regional Specialization
One important aspect of the catching-up process of the eastern German
manufacturing sector is to find a specialization pattern as to products and
markets which is in accordance with its comparative advantages. It is
well-known that in the socialist economy this pattern was heavily distorted
[Landesmann and Szekely 1995; Jackson and Biesbrouck 1995]. In this
context, it is astonishing to see that the sectoral specialization in the field
of manufacture on a two-digit level in the GDR did not show significant17
differences compared to the specialization of the manufacturing sector in
the FRG.
6 As a consequence, changes in the sectoral structure in eastern
Germany after the unification have been relatively small and have devel-
oped in a parallel way as to western Germany (Table 4).
However, a closer look at the figures reveals some minor but interesting
structural development patterns. In two respects, the emerging sectoral
pattern in eastern Germany shows typical signs of a dual economy:
• Whereas the shares of most industries producing intermediate goods
and consumer non-durables have increased .or have remained sta-
ble, those of some industries producing equipment goods have
fallen. The most striking feature is the collapse of the machinery in-
dustry, once the showcase of the GDR industry. This type of dualism
can be explained by the special German way of transformation, which
has pushed the decline of industries producing goods saleable in in-
ternational markets and the revival of industries serving mainly local
markets [Gerling and Schmidt 1997].
• Whereas the shares of most industries producing human capital-in-
tensive goods have declined or remained unchanged, those of most
industries producing fixed capital-intensive goods have remarkably
increased. Huge investment subsidies have encouraged building up
large modern fixed capital-intensive capacities, in particular in the re-
This was shown by Schmidt and Naujoks [1995]. However, from this one cannot
conclude that both specialization patterns were more or less identical. The GDR
production structure was biased in favour of poor product design and quality, low
productivity and overall performance and high resource costs. In fact, there was a
significant — vertical — differentiation.18
finery, chemical and road vehicle industries. These industries have
caught up rapidly. _....•
Table 4 - Structure of Gross Output of Eastern and Western German
Manufacturing
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].19
A special case is the favourable development of construction-related in-
dustries such as glass, pottery and mineral products or metal products
(which in the NACE classification includes steel construction). This can be
explained with the building boom in eastern Germany which, however,
has surpassed its peak by now.
All in all, the sectoral adjustment of the eastern German manufacturing
sector is far from coming to an end. The congruence on the aggregate
level conceals a strong vertical differentiation between eastern and west-
ern German producers — with respect to product quality and product
markets as well as with respect to technological and organizational envi-
ronment. The division of labour corresponds to an inter-industry type
rather than an intra-industry one. However, as far as wage rates will
equalize, there is a strong pressure towards an upward movement ending
up in an intra-industry specialization. Thus, the hopes have to be pinned
on a few promising branches — namely the car industry and the micro-
electronics industry — which have started to establish highly productive
and innovative production centres in several eastern German regions.
The picture of weakness is completed by poor market specialization. The
main sales markets are local and regional markets in eastern Germany
— almost half of the overall sales are realized there. Foreign markets play
only a minor role. Export quotas were on average not even half as high as
in western Germany in 1995, and the contribution to overall German for-
eign sales was only 2.5 percent — which is very modest considering the
share of eastern German in overall German population of around 20 per-
cent (Table 5). Only in a few branches, eastern German firms have man-
aged to offer a product range which is in line with international prefer-
ences. However, among these are in particular light industries such as20
food, textiles and clothing. In sharp contrast to these are the traditionally
export-orientated capital goods industries, which obviously have not yet
got over the breakdown of eastern European markets.
Table 5 - Export Quota
3 of Eastern and Western German
Manufacturing
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].21
Table 6 - Share of Eastern German in overall German Manufacturing
Sales













































































































Enterprises with 20 and more employees. - "Without publishing. -
 cWithout recycling.
Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].
To a certain extent, the low export quotas might reflect the suboptimal
size structure in eastern German manufacturing: the very high share of22
smaller firms which are typically local players with most of their customers
in the vicinity. However, their contribution to overall German manufactur-
ing sales in domestic markets is still relatively low: it was only 7 percent in
1995 (Table 6). This is to a great extent due to a lack of reputation and
brand names. Eastern German producers find it extremely difficult to gain
access to the networks of large retail chain stores, which usually expect
from their suppliers not only products which represent a good value but
also extensive customizing and sales promotion activities.
Sailing into the safe harbour of local markets may be the need of the mo-
ment for many companies. But it is a dangerous strategy. In the medium
and long run, it may prove to be a trap without any escape. Usually, local
markets can provide only a limited growth potential. Consequently, the re-
cent sharp slow-down in the growth rate of disposable income in the east-
ern economy has promptly caused also a sharp slow-down in the growth
rate of economic activity as most companies have not been able to com-
pensate for this on foreign markets.
3 Gross Output and Value Added
Vertical supplier relationships between companies can also affect effi-
ciency. In western market economies, many companies have reorganized
these in recent years by sourcing out parts of their activities — buying
outside rather than making more and more inside [McMillan 1995]. The di-
rect gains from this strategy result from a finer division of labour, which
lowers production costs through specialization. As a result, the share of
value added in gross output has steadily decreased.
The socialist conglomerates, in contrast, were extremely vertically inte-
grated 'production units', producing most of their inputs inside. When they23
were split up, privatized and reorganized, the new firms started to opti-
mize their value-adding chain. Two contrasting kinds of changes oc-
curred:
First, they began to purchase more inputs, replacing parts of inside
production. By that, the share of value added in gross output de-
creased.
• Second, they began to restructure their production, replacing low-
value-adding activities by high-value-adding activities. By that, the
share of value added in gross output increased.
In the early stage, as a result of the splitting-up of conglomerates,: the first
effect was predominant. The share of value added in grdss output feli
dramatically, revealing, however, the poor performance of most of the
companies rather than an advanced restructuring process according to
the western example. Meanwhile this share has increased: from 14 p.e. in
1991 to almost 20 p.c. in 1994. Nevertheless, it is, on average, still con-
siderably lower than in western Germany (Table 7). Only in a few
branches, the net production quota has almost reached or even sur-
passed the western German level (refinery, paper and pulp processing,
printing). Interestingly, the gap has narrowed in basic goods and con-
sumer goods industries, not so much in capital goods industries.24
Table 7 - Share of Value Added
3 in Gross Output in Eastern and
Western German Manufacturing
1


























































































































































output minus material consumption, merchandise for resale, subcontracting
Dther service costs, rents and leases, other costs, depreciations, indirect
taxes less subsidies. - "Enterprises with 20 and more employees only.
Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG.25
Table 8 - Share of Selected Costs in Gross Output in Eastern and
Western German Manufacturing
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Source: Centra! Statistical Office of the FRG.
The low share of value added stems from the unfavourable cost structure
of eastern German companies (Table 8).
• Material consumption in relation to gross output has decreased only
marginally since 1991. In 1994, it still exceeded the quota of western
German companies by 16 percentage points (Table 8). This cannot
be explained by the dominance of material-intensive industries. On
the contrary, a rough calculation shows that the quota would have
been even higher if eastern Germany had had the same structure of
production as western Germany. Many eastern German plants are
still operating as 'prolonged workbenches' of western German com-
panies. They frequently perform relatively simple production steps
creating only a low value added, such as assembling or refining,
which imply high shares of material supply.
9 Energy consumption, although decreasing in relation to gross output
between 1991 and 1994, is also still higher than in western Germany.26
This is mainly due to the energy-intensive production structure within
industries: the chemical industry in eastern Germany, e.g., is an im-
portant supplier of mass-produced articles like primary products, fer-
; tilizers, lacquers and plastics while in western Germany it is rather a
supplier of sophisticated products, in particular of Pharmaceuticals.
7
• Finally, depreciations on fixed capital and interest payments for out-
side capital are almost twice as high as those of western German
companies. This is the consequence of the modern capital equip-
ment established in recent years.
The unfavourable cost structure of eastern German companies, however,
must be partly ascribed to the low capacity utilization. Most of the cost
categories, except material consumption, are fixed costs. Unit costs tend
to decrease with the increase of output and sales. Therefore, companies
are trapped: a higher capacity utilization could lower their costs, but with-
out lower costs a higher capacity utilization is hardly achievable.
4 Investment and Productivity
Companies in transformation countries started into the market economy
with an obsolete capital equipment and enormous overmanning. There-
fore, investments in the fixed capital stock and a reduction in employment
mark the route to raise productivity.
As the potential for labour augmenting is limited (there are some com-
plementaries between input of labour and output), the strategic variable
It should also be noted that due to the monopolistic position of suppliers, prices
for electricity in eastern Germany are by one fifth higher than in western Germany.27
must be capital spending. Consequently, economic policy for eastern
Germany has considered the rebuilding of a new capital equipment as a
precondition for an economic revival [Schmidt 1996].
Table 9 - Relative Capital Intensity and Labour Productivity of Eastern
German Manufacturing
3 by Selected Industries 1994
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Enterprises with 20 and more employees only. - "Fixed capital stock per working
hour. -
 cPer employee.
Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG; DIW; ifo; own calculations.
In fact, as a result of heavy government support, investments in the east-
ern German capital stock have been impressive. Meanwhile, most of the28
capital stock in the manufacturing sector has been completely renewed. In
addition, fast progress has been made in raising capital intensity. An in-
ternal estimation by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)
suggests that at the end of 1994, the capital stock per working hour in
eastern German manufacturing reached on average 96 percent of the
western German level (Table 9).
8 However, this astonishing result needs
some qualifying:
• First, there is a wide dispersion between industries. In basic goods
industries, capital intensity is significantly higher than in western
Germany. This is partly due to differences in product mix and, hence,
in production technology. In other industries, capital intensity is sig-
nificantly lower.
• Second, in eastern Germany there is a considerable share of idle ca-
pacities. On average, capacity utilization is by some 10 percent lower
than in western German manufacturing. Actual capital input per
working hour, therefore, has reached somewhat more than 90 per-
cent — as it is suggested by potential capital input.
• Third, there are many investments which though still incomplete
nonetheless appear in the statistics. In particular in basic goods in-
dustries, the gestation period of new investments can involve several
years. The high relative capital intensity in eastern German refinery
industry, e.g., can be mainly explained by the large investment pro-
Calculating the eastern German capital stock is a crucial task, mainly due to the
-.problems of evaluating the investments done before summer 1990 and the scrap-
pings made thereafter.29
ject of Elf Aquitaine Corp. in Leuna that will not be finished before
1998.
• Fourth, there is a higher proportion of blue collar jobs (which are
relatively capital-intensive) in eastern Germany and of white collar
jobs (which are comparably low capital-intensive) in western Ger-
many. In the eastern parts, western firms mainly run assembly plants
and simple services, while their headquarters, research departments
and high value-adding services are concentrated in the western
parts.
 c ;
For all these reasons, a substantial subtraction should be made. It seems
reasonable to calculate that the used capital stock per working hour in
eastern German manufacturing has reached not more than 75 percent of
the western German level at the end of 1994.
To a certain extent the productivity gap between east and west — on av-
erage more than one third in terms of gross output and more than one
half in terms of value added — can be explained by a,lower capital inten-
sity. However, there is no correlation between variations of inter-industry
capital intensities and those of inter-industry productivities. Further em-
pirical work is required to explain this puzzle.30
Table 10- Electricity Consumption per Working Hour
3 in Eastern and
Western German Manufacturing
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].
It is obvious that differences in capital intensity are not fuliy responsible for
the large productivity gap. A comparison of electricity consumption per
working hour, which is a proxy for the degree of mechanization of the pro-
duction process, shows that in 1995 in most industries, electricity inputs in
eastern and western companies did not differ so much. Among a few ex-
ceptions are industries with a different product mix, such as metals and
metal products (where western Germany holds a relatively high share of31
the electricity intensive aluminium industry in total) and transport equip-
ment (where eastern Germany holds a relatively high share of the less
electricity-intensive shipbuilding and railway transport industries) (Ta-
ble 10). This implies that many eastern German companies have been
able to catch up in applying the same technology as their western coun-
terparts. They do not.succeed in appropriating all of the returns to their
physical investments, though. It is clear that, besides investments in
equipment, other factors may contribute to productivity growth such as
specific investments in research and development, organizational strate-
gies and structures or corporate culture. More generally, it seems that
many eastern German companies suffer from inappropriate modes of
doing business rather than from lack of physical capital. However, it is
evident that there are many unanswered questions here.
5 Wages and Employment
The high cost of labour is the eastern German economy's Achilles heel.
On average, wages and salaries in the manufacturing sector increased
from below one third of the western German level in 1991 to almost two
thirds in 1994, a figure well above the eastern German level of productiv-
ity (Table 11). The most drastic increase in industries with a traditionally
strong influence of trade unions — in the metal and metal products indus-
try, in the machinery industry, in electrical engineering and some other
capital goods industries —, is melting away any potential comparative ad-
vantage of low labour costs.32
Table 11 - Ratio of Eastern to Western German Manufacturing
3 Wages
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].
It is often argued that labour costs could not be the source of competitive
weakness since wages and salaries in eastern Germany are still signifi-
cantly lower than in western Germany. However, wages and salaries are
only one side of the coin. The other side is productivity. Taking a look at
the unit labour costs, which include both sides, reveals that most eastern
German industries have a strong competitive disadvantage to western
German ones (Table 12). In particular, numerous branches that are prone
to export considerable shares of their production — e.g. chemicals, engi-
neering, electrical engineering and shipbuilding — are burdened by ex-33
cessive labour costs, which can to a certain extent explain the. low shares
of these branches in overall German foreign sales. The only eastern
German export branch which documents a somewhat more positive de-
velopment concerning wages, unit labour costs and development of em-
ployment is the road vehicles industry. Its relatively favourable unit labour
costs noted for 1995 seem to be influenced by the two highly productive
assembly plants that General Motors and VW set up in Thuringia and
Saxony.
Among the industries which managed to achieve or to maintain a rela-
tively balanced level of unit labour costs as to western Germany, we find
in particular many locally-orientated industries like e.g. quarrying, wood
processing, printing, food and beverages. In these industries, the wage
increase has been comparably moderate due to the small size of many
firms and their possibility to stay outside or leave employers organiza-
tions.
The negative effects of the expensive wage strategy on the level of em-
ployment are more than obvious. From 1991 to 1995 the number of em-
ployees in eastern German manufacturing fell from 1.6 million to 1300,000
(-65 p.c). Eastern Germany's contribution to overall Germany's manufac-
turing employment decreased from 18 percent to 9 percent (Table 13).
The decline was most dramatic in capital goods industries (machinery,
electrical engineering) and in labour-intensive consumer goods industries
(leather, clothing, furniture, toys). It was less dramatic in beverages, food
and tobacco as well as in some other industries mainly producing for local
markets (glass, pottery, mineral products), which are naturally not hit so
strongly by international competition and which, in addition, benefit from
high consumptive transfer payments to eastern Germany.34
Table 12 - Ratio of Payroll to Value Added (Unit Labour Costs) in Eastern
and Western German Manufacturing



















































































































Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG.35
Table 13 - Share of Eastern German in overall German Manufacturing
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].
The conflict between wage adjustment and employment is the key di-
lemma in the transformation of the eastern German economy. As long as
the gap between productivity and wages persists and as long as employ-
ment is low, massive transfers from western Germany will be neces-
sary— to maintain consumption and to spur investment. It is evident that
a re-increase in employment can only be expected under an about-turn of
wage policy. Actually, it is not enough to postpone the dynamics of wage
adjustment as it happened recently. A substantial reduction of the leyel of
wages and salaries would be necessary. Otherwise, much of the invest-
ment dynamics might get lost [Thiemann and Breitner 1995].36
V Conclusions and Policy Implications
In the seven years after economic unification, eastern German companies
have made great efforts to reach the efficiency level of their western Ger-
man counterparts. However, against the unpleasant background of the
high pace of wage increase, they have not gained much ground. With re-
spect to competitiveness, there is still a large gap between companies in
the east and in the west.
Although eastern German companies differ widely with respect to owner-
ship status, size and industry [Gerling and Schmidt 1997], most of them
still suffer from the same problems: a poor sectoral and regional speciali-
zation, an insufficient integration in international and nation-wide supplier
and sales networks, an under-utilization of their productive capacities and,
as a result, a low productivity and a negative rate of return.
The key policy question is how to overcome these difficulties.
• The strategy which is preferred by most economists and policy mak-
| ' ers is to continue the massive government support for eastern Ger-
many. The rationale behind this strategy is to raise the eastern Ger-
man capital stock in terms of quality and quantity to the level of west-
ern Germany as soon as possible. It is supposed that the productivity
gap will close when the capital stocks in east and west are at about
the same level. However, there is some evidence that eastern Ger-
many's productivity growth does no longer keep pace with capital
stock growth —that the elasticity of the growth of productivity with
respect to capital stock growth has become significantly smaller than
one. In addition, there is also some evidence that under the actual
wage strategy the incentives for additional investments are declin-
ing — that in particular the elasticity of investment with respect to37
transfer payments has become significantly smaller than one. As a
result, the fiscal costs of this strategy must be rising and may finally
become unpayable.
• The alternative strategy would be to encourage eastern Germany to
follow its own avenue as it has recently been proposed by Paque
[1997]. His argument is that due to the rapid increases in the level of
eastern wages relative to eastern productivity even massive transfer
payments from the west cannot transform eastern Germany into a
power-house since the effects of both are not symmetrical. Paque
recommends that eastern Germany should strengthen its attractive-
ness for mobile resources — with all possible parameters of loca-
tional competition, including downward flexibility of wages. The pre-
conditions for a take-off can only emerge from 'the bottom' but can-
not be created from'the top'.
From an economic point of view, the arguments for a volte-face in eco-
nomic policy appear to be convincing. However, they are out of touch with
political reality. Eastern Germans contribute in fact just 10 percent to
overall German GDP but they account for 20 percent of the voters. Con-
sequently, the Federal Government has recently decided to continue its
support for eastern Germany 'on a high level' until the end of 2004
— which means: business as usual. This might help some politicians to
maximize their votes but it is obviously not the, right course to be charted,
namely to shift the balance from wage convergence to efficiency conver-
gence.38
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